

## Break the Taboos, Second-order entities!

### Second-orderism and Unsaturatedness

*Abstract.* Second-orderists, who think second-order quantification is a *sui generis* form of quantification, almost never talk about second-order entities and their nature. This is not a coincidence. Talking about second-order entities requires using nominal expressions like ‘properties’ in the natural language, and that undermines the thesis of second-orderism. For the orthodox is that nominal expressions like ‘properties’ are expressions for first-order entities. So, if second-orderists start to talk about second-order entities using nominal expressions, that would make them first-orderists who construe second-order entities as first-order entities, that is, who think second-order quantifications are in fact (restricted) first-order quantifications. So, talking about second-order entities and their nature is self-undermining for second-orderists. This is why they almost never talk about second-order entities and their nature. They end up putting a taboo on talking about them, though not explicitly. In this paper, I have two aims: first, I aim to break this (implicit) taboo, so that we (second-orderists) can freely talk about second-order entities and their nature. Utilizing the notion of unsaturatedness, I argue that if one can establish the unsaturatedness of one’s second-order entities (e.g., properties, concepts, or sets), then the taboo can be broken, and one can freely talk about them. Second, I propose my own account of second-order entities, I call *Way-Realism*, where second-order entities are identified as ways, and I establish the unsaturatedness of ways (my second-order entities) with *Way-Realism*. This would show that I am free from the taboo, and that I can freely talk about ways (my second-order entities) and their nature. (abstract: 254/paper: 10536)

*Keywords.* Second-orderism, Second-order entities, Second-order quantification, Unsaturatedness, Higher-order Metaphysics, Ways

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